

APPENDIX

THE PREPARATION OF ORE 1

1. The preparation of ORE 1 was not typical of the procedures to be followed in such cases, because of:

a. The unusual urgency: we received notice on Friday that a finished report must reach the Director by Tuesday morning.

b. Our shorthandedness: the Acting Assistant Director was the only experienced analyst we could spare from inescapable routine tasks to prepare and coordinate the report.

c. The existence of JIS 80/26, which provided a composite statement of the intelligence on the subject, fully coordinated and concurred in by all of the intelligence agencies concerned, at least on the working level.

2. JIS 80/26 was an up-to-date revision of JIC 250/8 prepared by the Working Committee established under C.I.G. Directive No. 9. Its bulk precluded its use without modification as a response to the several similar requests then made simultaneously upon G-2, J.I.C., and C.I.G., but it was the obvious starting point for the preparation of the estimates required.

3. The ORE plan for meeting these requirements was to have competent personnel extract the required intelligence from JIS 80/26 and assemble it in an integrated and coherent form for review, on Monday, by the appropriate specialists from the Departmental agencies. The Acting Assistant Director, ORE, expecting to have to do much of this himself, met with the J.I.S. at about noon on Friday to see how much could be accomplished on a cooperative basis, eliminating duplication of effort. He found that the dozen members of J.I.S. had no idea of preparing any response themselves from the intelligence available in JIS 80/26, but instead had referred the problem to an ad hoc committee of Departmental specialists. In consequence it proved impossible during Friday afternoon, to reach any of the Departmental specialists concerned for consultation.

4. On Saturday morning the Acting Assistant Director, ORE, made contact with the ad hoc committee and

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a. Confirmed that JIS 80/26 was still valid as a coordinated expression of Departmental intelligence on the subject.

b. Learned that, nevertheless, the ad hoc committee was making no use of JIS 80/26 in the preparation of its draft. (Instead it was merely compiling such ideas as occurred to its members impromptu.)

c. Learned the tenor of the draft in preparation by the ad hoc committee.

5. Regardless of the time factor and the labor involved in exploiting JIS 80/26, the Acting Assistant Director, ORE, was unwilling that the maturely considered and coordinated intelligence contained therein should be discarded in favor of an impromptu and unanalytic response. Realizing that if JIS 80/26 was to be exploited at all, he must do it himself, he spent the rest of Saturday (until 9 PM) and Sunday (until 3 AM) extracting the required intelligence from JIS 80/26 and drafting a report based thereon and on certain cables from Embassy Moscow (Mr. Kennan) which were known to be universally accepted. Early on Monday copies of this draft were delivered to the Departmental specialists concerned, to J.I.S., and to Gen. Lemnitzer (J.S.S.C.) who had asked to participate.

6. At 1400 on Monday the Acting Assistant Director, ORE, met with Gen. Lemnitzer, Messrs. Morrison and Barnard (State), Colonels Park and Bernier (G-2), Capt. Frankel (ONI), and Col. Wallace (A-2) to review the ORE draft. This representative group was complimentary in its acceptance of the substance of the paper. Certain modifications in detail were proposed and accepted. The only divergence of opinion concerned the wording of an introductory statement on Soviet foreign policy, regarding which the representatives of G-2 and ONI contended for a form of expression which seemed to the representatives of State and ORE an extravagant and unanalytic assertion irrelevant to the function of the report. The issue seemed essentially rhetorical. It moreover lay clearly within the primary competence of State.

7. After this meeting, until about midnight, the Acting Assistant Director, ORE, was engaged in revising the ORE draft in the light of the discussion and in checking it against the ad hoc committee's draft, which he had been able to obtain only by borrowing the J.I.S. file copy at the close of the day. In this revision, paragraph 2 was inserted to meet the issue indicated in paragraph 6 above. The J.I.C. paper proved to be a miscellany of random ideas, assertive rather than analytic in approach, but no substantial contradiction was apparent between it and the ORE draft.

8. Typing of the revised draft was not completed until

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about noon on Tuesday. It was submitted to the Director that afternoon with an oral explanation that it had been:

a. Based on JIS 80/26

b. Revised after review by the Departmental specialists.

c. Checked against the J.I.C. report.

The Director was informed of the issue indicated in paragraph 6 above and of the insertion of paragraph 2 to cover that point as State and ORE saw it.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP
(Revised 10 Sept 1946)

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REMARKS: